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Michael Keren 
A Canadian Alternative to the "Clash of 
Civilizations99* 
Abstract 
This article shows how Yann Martel 's novel Life of Pi, following a well-
established Canadian tradition of breaching cultural divides, provides an 
alternative to the ^clash of civilizations " theoiy prevalent in today's 
international arena. It argues that the novel challenges three foundations of 
the theory — the consideration of religious revival in contradiction to 
scientific rationality, the tying of civilization to the negation of other 
civilizations, and the assumption that conflict between civilizations is 
immanent—and proposes an alternative of coexistence between civilizations, 
consistent with Canadian foreign policy norms. 
Résumé 
Cet article montre comment le roman de Yann Martel, L'histoire de Pi, qui 
perpétue la tradition canadienne bien établie consistant à combler le fossé 
culturel, offre une solution de rechange à la théorie du «, choc des 
civilisations » en vogue sur la scène internationale aujourd 'hui. Il soutient 
que le roman réfute trois piliers de la théorie — le fait de mettre le renouveau 
religieux en contradiction avec la rationalité scientifique, le fait d'utiliser la 
civilisation pour nier les autres civilisations et l'hypothèse que le conflit entre 
les civilisations est immanent — et propose une sorte de coexistence entre les 
civilisations conforme aux normes de la politique étrangère du Canada. 
In 1955, Lester Pearson, then secretary of state for external affairs who two 
years later won the Nobel Peace Prize, published Democracy in World 
Politics. In that book, Pearson wrote: "The major issues of diplomacy for 
several centuries have, for the West, been reflections of the changing 
relations between the various states of Europe. Today the most far-reaching 
problems arise no longer between nations within a single civilization but 
between civilizations themselves" (1955, 82). 
This observation, that civilizations are replacing nation-states as main 
actors in the international system, was accompanied by foreign policy 
conclusions that affected Canadian foreign policy for years to come. 
Pearson emphasized the renaissance of cultures in Asia. If in the 19th 
century the Orient gave the impression of stagnation, with its great periods 
of achievement behind it, a new vitality was now apparent. Pearson 
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welcomed that vitality, writing that the new restlessness and vision among 
Islamic, Indian, and Southeast Asian civilizations "is something which all 
men of good-will should welcome" (1955, 83). 
Pearson was aware of the fear created by rising new powers but claimed 
that the revival of ancient civilizations, however unfamiliar, may be "full of 
interest to those with the humility and awareness to learn" {ibid.). He did not 
ignore the conflicts and wars between civilizations in the past but argued 
that they do not prevent an option of coexistence: "We are now emerging 
into an age when different civilizations will have to learn to live side by side 
in peaceful interchange, learning from each other, studying each other's 
history and ideas and art and culture, mutually enriching each other's lives. 
The alternative, in this overcrowded little world, is misunderstanding, 
tension, clash, and catastrophe" (83-84). 
The need to coexist with other civilizations in order to avoid a clash has 
become a cornerstone of Canadian foreign policy. The devotion to 
peacekeeping, the operation of CIDA, Canada's wheat sales to China and 
the Soviet Union during the Cold War, and its efforts to serve as honest 
broker in various international crises were largely an outgrowth of a 
realization that Canada's national survival vis-à-vis friends and foes alike 
depends on its breach of the worldwide political and cultural divides. 
Pearson's vision has become part of the Canadian saga, largely because that 
vision had deep roots. Canadian culture was always marked by an urge to 
distinguish itself from cultural allies such as Great Britain and the United 
States while recognizing the rights of aboriginal people and absorbing 
immigrants under the banner of multiculturalism, which has granted 
Canada the title of "first postmodern state" (Bumsted 2001,32). It may thus 
not be incidental that one of the strongest objections to the "clash of 
civilizations" theory, so prevalent in world politics today, has been 
provided in a novel by a Canadian author. 
This theory has been elaborated by Harvard professor Samuel 
Huntington in an article in Foreign Affairs in 1993 and three years later in a 
book titled The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order 
(2003). The book has been declared a work "touched by genius ... a 
brilliant, riveting, and utterly original book, masterful in presentation and 
brimming with insight, its disturbing conclusions corroborated by an 
impressive array of data and well-chosen quotations" (Bacevich 1997,40). 
Few books have sparked so much interest and discussion,, especially after 
the attack on the United States on September 11,2001, when Huntington's 
insights on international politics as dominated by cultural antagonisms 
seemed to many to have been confirmed by the events. Huntington argues 
that in the post-Cold War world, the most important distinctions between 
people are no longer ideological, political, or economic but cultural. 
Nations are preoccupied with their cultural identify and use politics to not 
only advance their interests but also define that identity. 
42 
A Canadian Alternative to the "Clash of Civilizations" 
Huntington defines "civilization" as the highest level of identification to 
which a person belongs, emphasizing religion as a central defining feature 
of any civilization. The great religions prevailing in the world, Christianity, 
Islam, Hinduism, and Confucianism, are central in his design of 
international politics as dominated by seven civilizations: Sinic, Japanese, 
Hindu, Islamic, Orthodox, Western, and Latin American. Western 
civilization, for example, has its origins in "Western Christendom" (2003, 
70). Western Christianity, Huntington writes, first Catholicism and then 
Catholicism and Protestantism, is historically the single most important 
characteristic of Western civilization, having provided its adherents with a 
sense of community that distinguished them from Islam, Eastern 
Orthodoxy, and so on. 
Considering the first Gulf War as the primary conflict between 
civilizations in the modern era, Huntington predicts a sharpening of 
conflicts in the manner of tribal wars. "Civilizations are the ultimate human 
tribes," he writes, "and the clash of civilizations is tribal conflict on a global 
scale" (2003,207). In particular, he points at the clash between the West and 
Islam, claiming that its causes lie not in transitory phenomena such as 
12th-century Christian passion or 20lh-century Muslim fundamentalism but 
rather "flow from the nature of the two religions and the civilizations based 
on them" (2003, 210). 
Critics have related to various aspects of the book. It has been argued that 
most Western states are now multi or bicultural and are becoming more so. 
They are thus potentially part of multiple civilizations, a situation 
Huntington brushes over by designating religion as the deciding factor 
(Graham 1994). If transnational efforts to impose one culture on another 
invite strife, it was asked, why should such efforts have harmonious results 
if attempted within a single nation-state? And is it not still possible for 
countries to have allies across the civilizational divide? (Elliott 1996). 
Some have called for public denunciation of the book, claiming that 
Huntington has made a pitch to the ears of the powerful, a worrisome pitch 
because of its xenophobic and self-fulfilling prophecy. Its thesis should not 
guide 21st-century policy-making (O'Brien 1997). 
One of the strongest criticisms of the "clash of civilizations" theory can 
be found in Canadian author Yann Martel 's novel Life of Pi, which provides 
a profound examination of the theory's philosophical foundations and 
proposes an alternative of coexistence between civilizations, consistent 
with Pearson's vision. I do not mean to imply that this novel, or for that 
matter any novel, can be read as a national emblem or that MartePs fiction is 
representative of Canadian literature. Martel has obviously not intended to 
provide a Canadian alternative to Huntington, but in many ways he did. For 
one, following his receipt of the prestigious Booker prize for Life of Pi in 
2002, he has been embraced by official Canada. His rejection of religious 
exclusionism, for instance, has been attributed by an official Foreign 
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Affairs document to his being a child of the Quiet Revolution (Foreign 
Affairs 2003). The Quiet Revolution refers to the social changes taking 
place in Quebec, MartePs province, under Liberal leader Jean Lesage in the 
sixties (Bélanger 2000). MartePs extensive visits to mosques, churches, 
and temples, and his reading of the Bible, the Quran, and the Bhagavad-Gita 
in preparation for Life of Pi have been attributed to that revolution in which 
traditional religious, boundaries were partly replaced by concerns with 
modernization, planning, and social change. In interviews he gave after 
publication of the novel, Martel himself emphasized his Canadian 
reference point: "I can't live for more than four years outside of Canada... 
I'm Canadian, so ultimately that is my reference point" {Guardian 2002). 
The Canadian origins of MartePs thought should not be stretched beyond 
limit, especially since Life of Pi itself plays down any fixed identities, but it 
is hard not to see the roots of his message of coexistence between 
civilizations in legal documents like the constitutional act of 1982, which 
recognizes the rights of Indian, Inuit, and Métis people; in the Canadian 
multiculturalism act, which promotes "the understanding that 
multiculturalism is a fundamental characteristic of the Canadian heritage 
and identity and that it provides an invaluable resource in the shaping of 
Canada's future" (Canadian Multiculturalism Act 1985); in political 
organizations like the National Muslim-Christian Liaison Committee; in 
practices like the support given by the Canadian-Jewish congress for Sikh 
army veterans who were prevented from entering the Royal Canadian 
Legions; or in cultural products like Leonard Cohen's "Sisters of Mercy," to 
mention only a few examples. 
Let us now consider the alternative proposed in Life of Pi to the "clash of 
civilizations" theory. There has been considerable debate over the 
examination of novels as sources of insights on political affairs (Keren 
2003), but here such an examination is particularly tempting because 
Martel presents the fictional tale of 16-year-old Pi Patel, an Indian boy 
finding himself with a 450-pound Bengal tiger on a lifeboat in the Pacific 
Ocean, as a statement about reality: "That's what fiction is about, isn't it, the 
selective transforming of reality? The twisting of it to bring out its 
essence?" (Martel 2001, viii). The symbolic nature of Life of Pi allows its 
consideration as a simplified model of the world, of the kind sought by 
Huntington, who admits that the picture of world politics he draws is highly 
simplified. Like the tale of a boy and a tiger on a lifeboat, "it omits many 
things, distorts some things, and obscures others. Yet if we are to think 
seriously about the world, and act effectively in it, some sort of simplified 
map of reality, some theory, concept, model, paradigm, is necessary" 
(Huntington 2003, 29). Thus, it seems useful to derive insights on world 
politics from a parable that to a large extent provides what Huntington calls 
"a map that both portrays reality and simplifies reality in a way that best 
serves our purposes" (2003, 31 ). 
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Both works are treated here as simplified models of the world order at the 
turn of the millennium and are examined for the prescriptions stemming 
from those models. In what follows, I analyze three foundations of 
Huntington's "clash of civilizations" theory: the consideration of religious 
revival in contradiction to scientific rationality, the tying of civilization to 
the negation of other civilizations, and the assumption that conflict between 
civilizations is immanent. Analyzing Life of Pi as a symbolic sea journey 
tale reminiscent of Robinson Crusoe, Moby Dick, or The Old Man and the 
Sea, and viewing the relations between the boy and the tiger as a metaphor, I 
show how each of these foundations is challenged. 
Religion and Rationality 
As a scholar of modernization, Huntington is concerned with the processes 
of industrialization, urbanization, increasing levels of literacy, education 
and wealth, social mobilization, and diversifying occupational structures. 
Although he stresses that there is no one pattern of modernization and 
clearly dissociates modernization from Westernization, he distinguishes 
between the scientific rationality underlying these processes of 
modernization and religion. While modernization is a product of the 
tremendous expansion of scientific and engineering knowledge beginning 
in the 18th century, religion is a 20th century response to it. "The most 
obvious, most salient, and most powerful cause of the global religious 
insurgence," he writes, "is precisely what was supposed to cause the death 
of religion: the processes of social, economic, and cultural modernization 
that swept across the world in the second half of the twentieth century" 
(Huntington 2003, 97). 
This view is shared by many who consider the contemporary resurgence 
of religion as a reaction against the secularism, moral relativism, and 
self-indulgence of the modern industrial state making use of the impressive 
achievements in science and engineering of the last two centuries to control 
and shape its environment. Its success in doing so creates vacuums filled by 
religious groups. As Huntington puts it, "In times of rapid social change, 
established identities dissolve, the self must be redefined, and new 
identities created. For people facing the need to determine Who am I? 
Where do I belong? religion provides compelling answers, and religious 
groups provide small social communities to replace those lost through 
urbanization" (2003, 97). 
Martel, however, refuses to accept the distinction between a secular, 
scientific, rational culture associated with modernity and religion. He 
brings the distinction adabsurdum in the figure of Pi's biology teacher, Mr. 
Satish Kumar, who believes in science but not in God. Mr. Kumar's total 
adherence to science is apparent in the shape of his body: "His construction 
was geometric: he looked like two triangles, a small one and a larger one, 
balanced on two parallel lines" (2001,25). He is a regular visitor to the zoo 
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managed by Pi's father, where each animal represents the triumph of logic 
and mechanics. To him, nature is an exceptionally fine illustration of 
science: "When Mr. Kumar visited the zoo, it was to take the pulse of the 
universe, and his stethoscopic mind always confirmed to him that 
everything was in order, that everything was order. He left the zoo feeling 
scientifically refreshed" (26). 
As a young man, Mr. Kumar was racked with polio and it was not God 
who saved him but medicine, which turned him into an atheist. Pi is 
influenced by him and begins to study zoology but also realizes that 
scientific knowledge without religious belief is meaningless. Once disaster 
.strikes — the Japanese ship on which the Patels and their zoo animals are 
sailing to Canada sinks and his whole family dies — reason alone does not 
provide answers. "And what of my extended family — birds, beasts and 
reptiles?" asks the boy who has lost everything: "They too have drowned. 
Every single thing I value in life has been destroyed. And I am allowed no 
explanation? I am to suffer hell without any account from heaven? In that 
case, what is the purpose of reason ... Is it no more than to shine at 
practicalities—the getting of food, clothing and shelter? Why can't reason 
give greater answers?" (98). 
Reason cannot give the answers and yet Pi does not give it up. The novel* 
is in many ways a song of praise to reason that is not devoid of a belief in 
God, and to a belief in God that does not exclude reason. At no point, for 
instance, does Pi rely on external redemption: "I had to stop hoping so much 
that a ship would rescue me. I should not count on outside help. Survival had 
to start with me. In my experience, a castaway's worst mistake is to hope too 
much and do too little. Survival starts by paying attention to what is close at 
hand and immediate. To look out with idle hope is tantamount to dreaming 
one's life away" (169). Moreover, Pi's belief in God is not blind: "Faith in 
God is an opening up, a letting go, a deep trust, a free act of love — but 
sometimes it was so hard to love" (208). Most importantly, it does not 
promise survival: "God's hat was always unraveling. God's pants were 
falling apart. God's cat was a constant danger. God's ark is a jail. God's wide 
acres were slowly killing me. God's ear didn 't seem to be listening" (209). 
But reason does also not assure survival unless accompanied by religious 
faith: "I was giving up. I would have given up—if a voice hadn't made itself 
heard in my heart. The voice said, 'I will not die. I refuse it. I will make it 
through this nightmare. I will beat the odds, as great as they are'" (148). 
Once he hears the voice, Pi begins to accumulate every piece of scientific 
knowledge in the fields of zoology, physics, engineering, and so on in order 
to survive. For example, "You see, waves and steady winds are usually 
perpendicular to each other. So, if a boat is pushed by a wind but held back 
by a sea anchor, it will turn until it offers the least resistance to the wind — 
that is, until it is in line with it and at right angle to the waves, which makes 
for a front-to-back pitching that is much more comfortable than a 
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side-to-side rolling ... What may seem like a detail to you was something 
which would save my life" (170). 
Martel realizes the difficulty in accepting the combination he proposes 
between rational, knowledge-based action and religious belief. This 
difficulty is nicely demonstrated toward the end of the novel when the 
miraculous survival story is put to the test of reason. Two Japanese officials 
investigating the sinking of the ship listen to Pi's story in disbelief because 
they apply rational criteria to it, but Martel shows these criteria are 
insufficient. Let me conclude this section by quoting from the exchange 
developing when the two rational officials say they do not believe that a 
16-year-old boy could survive a journey on a lifeboat with a 450-pound 
Bengal tiger: 
"'Zrc a lifeboat? Come on, Mr. Patel, it's just too hard to believe! ' 'Hard to 
believe? What do you know about hard to believe? ... Love is hard to 
believe, ask any lover. Life is hard to believe, ask any scientist. God is hard 
to believe, ask any believer. What is your problem with hard to believe?' 
'We're just being reasonable,' 'So am I! I applied my reason at every 
moment. Reason is excellent for getting food, clothing and shelter. Reason 
is the very best tool kit. Nothing beats reason for keeping tigers away. But be 
excessively reasonable and you risk throwing out the universe with the 
bathwater'" (297-98). 
Civilization as Negation 
Huntington's conception of civilization is strongly related to the negation 
of other civilizations, and much of his book is devoted to advancing the 
notion that civilizations are mutually exclusive. Considering the adherence 
to cultural heritage as a hunian need in the post-Cold War era, he writes that 
peoples and nations develop their identity by adhering to the things that 
mean most to them, which are determined in relation to others: "People use 
politics not just to advance their interests but also to define their identity. 
We know who we are only when we know who we are not and often only 
when we know whom we are against" (2003, 21). 
Huntington believes that there can be no true friends without true 
enemies and that unless we hate what we are not, we cannot love what we 
are. "For peoples seeking identity and reinventing ethnicity," he writes, 
"enemies are essential and the potentially most dangerous enemies occur 
across the fault lines between the world's major civilizations" (2003, 20). 
The very definition of civilization in this book involves negation: 
"Civilizations are the biggest 'we' within which we feel culturally at home 
as distinguished from all the other 'them' out there" (2003, 43). 
' In support of the notion that civilizations are mutually exclusive and 
depend on each other's negation, Huntington makes use of social 
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psychology theories like "distinctiveness theory," claiming that people 
define themselves by what makes them different from others in a particular 
context. Citing findings in social psychology showing, for example, that a 
woman psychologist in the company of a dozen women who work at other 
occupations thinks of herself as a psychologist while in a company of a 
dozen male psychologists she thinks of herself as a woman, Huntington 
concludes that "people define their identity by what they are not" (2003, 
67). This conclusion is reinforced by a view of religion — a central 
component of any civilization — as "positing a basic distinction between 
believers and nonbelievers, between a superior in-group and a different and 
inferior out-group" (2003, 97). 
The fictional character of 16-year-old Pi is used by Martel to challenge 
the notion of mutual exclusiveness of cultures. The author proposes an 
alternative notion of syncretism — that is, the adaptation and melding of 
different religious traditions. His starting point resembles Huntington's 
claim that there exists no universal religion or civilization and that it would 
be naïve to expect the coming together of humans throughout the world 
accepting common values, beliefs, orientations, practices, and institutions. 
As Huntington puts it, the sharing of a few fundamental values and 
institutions throughout history may explain some constants in human 
behaviour but does not illuminate or explain history. 
Martel agrees that an exploration of contemporary culture cannot focus 
on what Huntington calls "the Davos culture" (2003,57)—that is, the small 
percentage of people in the world who are fluent in English, travel a lot, 
control international institutions and business enterprises, and share values 
of individualism, market economy, and political democracy. Life of Pi is 
rooted in industrialized India and the Patel family is to a large extent part of 
the Davos culture: "We're a modern Indian family; we live in a modern 
way; India is on the cusp of becoming a truly modern and advanced nation" 
(2001,74). Consider the description of Pi's father, the zoo manager: "Father 
saw himself as part of the New India — rich, modern and as secular as ice 
cream. He didn't have a religious bone in his body. He was a businessman, 
pronounced èwsmessman in this case, a hardworking, earthbound 
professional, more concerned with inbreeding among the lions than any 
overarching moral or existential scheme" (65). 
Martel realizes that this form of existence often leads to a search for a 
more profound identity but does not presume mutual exclusiveness of 
religions. His protagonist constructs a religion based on incorporation 
rather than negation. When we first encounter Pi as an old man telling his 
story to the author, his house resembles a temple for all three religions 
Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam, "Upstairs in his office there is a brass 
Ganesha sitting cross-legged next to the computer, a wooden Christ on the 
Cross from Brazil on a wall, and a green prayer rug in a corner" (46). As we 
follow Pi's encounter with the three religions, we are faced with the 
48 
A Canadian Alternative to the "Clash of Civilizations" 
possibility that a cultural identity can be constructed that is based on 
incorporation of elements from all religions. 
Pi was born a Hindu. "1 owe to Hinduism the original landscape of my 
religious imagination, those towns and rivers, battlefields and forests, holy 
mountains and deep seas where gods, saints, villains and ordinary people 
rub shoulders, and, in doing so, define who and why we are" (50). The 
rubbing of shoulders, however, does not imply separation of one religious 
group from others but rather allows a confident look outward, toward other 
religions. By listening to Lord Krishna, Pi is led to meet Jesus Christ. This is 
not the meeting advocated by Christian evangelicals. Martel objects to 
evangelicals of all religions: "But we should not cling! A plague upon 
fundamentalists and literalists!" (49). Nor is it a simple revelation. To a 
young Hindu, Christian theology seems bizarre: "What? Humanity sins but 
it's God's son who pays the price?" (53). He can understand a god who puts 
up with adversity; after all, the gods of Hinduism also face their fair share of 
thieves, bullies, kidnappers, and usurpers, but the element of humiliation in 
Christianity is beyond his grasp: "I couldn't imagine Lord Krishna 
consenting to be stripped naked, whipped, mocked, dragged through the 
streets and, to top it off, crucified-and at the hands of mere humans, to boot" 
(54). 
Christianity is too hurried for the Hindu boy: "If Hinduism flows placidly 
like the Ganges, then Christianity bustles like Toronto at rush hour" (57). 
And yet it appeals to him because of its temporality: "Christianity stretches 
back through the ages, but in essence it exists only at one time: right now" 
(57). Since Pi lives "right now," he becomes a Christian, as well as a 
Muslim. Islam, he says, has a reputation even worse than other religions: 
"fewer gods, greater violence" (58), but it provides him with an element 
lacking in other religions: the immediacy of contact with God: "It felt good 
to bring my forehead to the ground. Immediately it felt like a deeply 
religious contact" (61). 
Martel is aware of the tendency of organized religions to consider their 
ceremonies and rituals as mutually exclusive, but to him this is neither a 
necessary not a deterministic trend. The dialogue he constructs between 
Pi's father and three wise men belonging to the three organized religions — 
Hinduism, Christianity, and Islam — may be read as an ironic statement on 
the assumption that the clash of civilizations is inevitable: "'What is your 
son doing going to temple?' asked the priest. 'Your son was seen in church 
crossing himself,' said the imam. 'Your son has gone Muslim,' said the 
pandit" (64). This kind of talk seems anachronistic in comparison to Pi's 
new identity (shared, it seems, by many early 21 st-century individuals) that 
crosscuts organized religions and cultures. As only Pi's mother seems to 
understand by nature of her being mum, bored and neutral on the subject of 
religion and hence a sharp observer of the contemporary world, the boy is 
"marching to a different drumbeat of progress" (75). He is certainly 
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marching to a different drumbeat than the three wise men marching toward 
a clash of civilizations. 
Martel makes explicit what he understands Pi's consciousness to consist 
of: "moral exaltation; lasting feelings of elevation, elation, joy; a 
quickening of the moral sense, which strikes one as more important than an 
intellectual understanding of things; an alignment of the universe along 
moral lines, not intellectual ones" (63). The author realizes that in a world 
believing either in scientific rationality or in fundamentalism and 
literalism, both of which lack a vision for life, it may be hard to develop such 
a moral attitude, but he believes that human consciousness marked by "a 
trusting sense of presence and of ultimate purpose" (ibid.) may be 
developing because, as in the case of Pi, neither science nor organized 
religion provides us with answers in the face of disaster. 
The Immanence of Conflict 
Huntington leaves little doubt that the mapping of world politics along the 
lines of civilizations implies an immanent conflict, which can be expected 
to be bloodier than the conflict between states. Wars between clans, tribes, 
ethnic groups, religious communities, and nations, he writes, have been 
prevalent in every era because they are rooted in the identities of people. 
They tend to be vicious and bloody, since fundamental issues of identity are 
at stake. Conflicts of identity can be expected to involve massacres, 
terrorism, rape, and torture and are particularly hard to resolve through 
negotiations and compromise. 
Although he realizes the existence of many forms of conflict — cold 
peace, cold war, trade war, quasi-war, uneasy peace, troubled relations, 
intense rivalry, competitive coexistence, arms races, and the like — 
Huntington sees little chance to avoid gigantic wars between states of 
different civilizations, and he even coins a special term, "fault line wars," to 
describe them. "Fault line wars go through processes of intensification, 
expansion, containment, interruption, and, rarely, resolution. These 
processes usually begin sequentially, but they also often overlap and may be 
repeated. Once started, fault line wars, like other communal conflicts, tend 
to take a life of their own and to develop in an action-reaction pattern" 
(2003,266). 
Huntington sees the emergence of a "hate dynamics" (2003, 266) in 
which mutual fears, distrust, and hatred feed on each other. "Each side 
dramatizes and magnifies the distinction between the forces of virtue and 
the forces of evil and eventually attempts to transform this distinction into 
the ultimate distinction between the quick and the dead" (ibid.). In his 
description of the dynamics of these wars, religion is given a central role: 
"In the course of the war, multiple identities fade and the identity most 
meaningful in relation to the conflict comes to dominate. That identity 
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almost always is defined by religion. Psychologically, religion provides the 
most reassuring and supportive justification for struggle against 'godless' 
forces which are seen as threatening" (2003, 267). 
"As the fault line war intensifies," Huntington adds, "each side 
demonizes its opponents, often portraying them as subhuman, and thereby 
legitimates killing them" (2003,271 ). These words sound so accurate that it 
is hard to imagine an intellectual construct contradicting them, and yet such 
a construct is worth considering if only to avoid the turning of Huntington's 
assumptions, widely accepted by policy-makers and large parts of the 
public, into a self-fulfilling prophecy. Martel raises the option of 
coexistence between the fiercest enemies nature has produced, but most 
interestingly presents it not as a form of idealism but as a realistic strategic 
option and policy program. 
At no point in Mattel's novel is there a shred of delusion that Bengal 
tigers are not dangerous enemies and would not remain so under all 
circumstances. As a child, Pi learned about the wild nature of animals: "I 
quite deliberately dressed wild animals in the tame costumes of my 
imagination. But I never deluded myself as to the real nature of my 
playmates" (2001, 34). When the boy finds himself on a lifeboat with the 
tiger named Richard Parker, the fear of the animal's wild nature is not 
lessened just because the two share the same fate: "He was a fierce, 
450-pound carnivore. Each of his claws was as sharp as a knife ... Any 
second I expected to see Richard Parker rising up and coming for me" (108). 
Martel does not expect harmony on the lifeboat, and any illusions the 
reader may have for a Disney-like tale are shattered by a gruesome 
description of the way various animals present in the beginning on the 
lifeboat are killed one by one: "A massive paw landed on its shoulders. 
Richard Parker's jaws closed on the side of the hyena's neck. Its glazed eye 
widened. There was a noise of organic crunching as windpipe and spinal 
cord were crushed. The hyena shook. Its eyes were dull. It was over" (151). 
Slowly and gradually, Martel leads us to the point at which the harsh reality 
cannot be overlooked: "Now we were two. In five days the populations of 
orang-utans, zebras, hyenas, rats, flies and cockroaches had been wiped 
out. Except for the bacteria and worms that might still be alone in the 
remains of the animals, there was no other life on the lifeboat but Richard 
Parker and me" (171). 
Not only is the existential state of affairs clear, so is the lack of good 
options to cope with it. Like a state — or civilization — finding itself 
vis-à-vis a fierce and dangerous enemy, all the options predicted by 
Huntington to be taken under these conditions — massacres, terrorism, 
rape, torture — are considered but are also found lacking. The parable may 
be seen as a demonstration of the futility of a whole range of options floating 
in the international sphere today. Here is Pi calculating his options: 
51 
International Journal of Canadian Studies 
Revue internationale d'études canadiennes 
"Plan Number one: Push Him off the Lifeboat. What good would 
that do? Even if I manage to shove 450 pounds of living, fierce 
animal off the lifeboat, tigers are accomplished swimmers... Plan 
Number Two: Kill Him with the Six Morphine Syringes. But I had 
no idea what effect they would have on him. Would they be enough 
to kill him? ... Plan Number Three: Attack Him with All Available 
Weaponry. Ludicrous. I wasn't Tarzan ... Plan Number Four: 
Choke Him ... A clever, suicidal plan. Plan Number Five: Poison 
Him, Set Him on Fire, Electrocute Him. How? With what? Plan 
Number Six: Wage a War of Attrition..." (157-58). 
This list of strategies aimed to overcome the tiger by force exposes a 
common fallacy that military plans are more "realistic" than a search for 
coexistence. Pushing, killing, and attacking one's enemy with all available 
weaponry is often mistaken for realpolitik, but not by Martel who considers 
all the above options, including the option of attrition, as an outgrowth of 
fear, life's only true opponent. Fear leads one to make rash decisions. "You 
dismiss your last allies, hope and trust. There, you've defeated yourself. 
Fear, which is but an impression, has triumphed over you" (162). 
Once the 16-year-old boy gives up the futile military plans (whose 
futility seems to grow proportionately to the degree of fear), he begins to 
make practical use of the unique combination of reason and faith he is 
endowed with. He assesses that in order to survive, a training program must 
be devised for the tiger that would delimit the territory between them and 
make Pi's territory utterly forbidden for Richard Parker. The interesting 
point about this training program, described at length in the novel, is its 
reliance on the continuing presence of the tiger in the boat. "It was not a 
question of him or me, but of him and me. We were, literally and 
figuratively, in the same boat. We would live — or we would die — 
together" (164). Pi gets inspiration, strength, and will to live from Richard 
Parker. It is the irony of the story, writes Martel, that the tiger's presence 
brought peace, purpose, and even wholeness to the boy. 
This point should be stressed. The immanence of war between 
civilizations implies that any civilization would feel more comfortable 
were it left alone in the universe. However, Martel reminds us that 
multiculturalism, a concept Huntington dismisses, may not just be a 
comfortable political solution (or slogan) when incumbents of different 
cultures are forced to live side by side; it also has intrinsic value: "I will tell 
you a secret: a part of me was glad about Richard Parker. Apart of me did not 
want Richard Parker to die at all, because if he died I would be left alone 
with despair, a foe even more formidable than a tiger. If I still had the will to 
live, it was thanks to Richard Parker. He kept me from thinking too much 
about my family and my tragic circumstances. He pushed me to go on 
living. I hated him for it, yet at the same time I was grateful" (164). 
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Martel's belief in coexistence between civilizations stems from his 
insight that war is nobody's desirable alternative if it can be avoided. This is 
sometimes hard to believe in light of the swiftness in which minor incidents 
spark major wars between nations, but it may be at least partly true in the 
human sphere as it is in the animal kingdom: "If I survived my 
apprenticeship as a high seas animal trainer, it was because Richard Parker 
did not really want to attack me. Tigers, indeed all animals, do not favor 
violence as a means of settling scores" (206). At the same time, Martel 
understands that the line between coexistence and being killed is very thin. 
As he advises any animal trainer: "You must be careful. You want to 
provoke your animal, but only so much. You don't want it to attack you 
outright. If it does, God be with you. You will be torn to pieces, trampled 
flat, disemboweled, very likely eaten" (203). 
Conclusion 
As hard as it is to derive insights on world politics from fictional tales whose 
interpretation is always uncertain, the symbolism we find in Life of Pi 
sparks fresh ideas that challenge the "clash of civilization" theory and 
provide a different set of policy prescriptions than the theory implies. 
Huntington is not explicit on what the world ought to do in light of the 
transformation it undergoes from economic, political, and ideological wars 
to fault line wars, but from the examples he uses it becomes clear that the 
mapping of the world along cultural lines means that people of similar 
cultures ought to stick together and not develop illusions about long-lasting 
coalitions crossing the cultural divide. 
In his discussion of the relations between Russia and Ukraine, for 
instance, he claims that since the cultural divide crosses not between these 
two states but between Orthodox Eastern Ukraine and Uniate Western 
Ukraine, the state-oriented approach that predicts conflict between the two 
states, and therefore urges Ukraine to develop nuclear capability if it is to 
stand up to Russia, should be replaced by a different policy: 
A civilizational approach would encourage cooperation between 
Russia and Ukraine, urge Ukraine to give up its nuclear weapons, 
promote substantial economic assistance and other measures to 
help maintain Ukrainian unity and independence, and sponsor 
contingency planning for the possible breakup of Ukraine (2003, 
37). 
In other words, peoples and nations ought to define their allies in cultural 
terms. Europe and America in particular, being the backbone of Western 
civilization, ought to align. This prescription adheres to the common sense 
of many, but Martel 's challenge is worth considering. The analysis ofLife of 
Pi as a symbolic tale, and of the relations between the boy and the tiger as a 
metaphor, makes one conclude that much more effort ought to be devoted to 
coexistence across the cultural divide. By constructing a metaphor of 
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coexistence, Martel does not exclude the possibility of a clash. He also does 
not promise us that in conditions of coexistence, Utopia will prevail. To the 
contrary, he draws a rather gloomy picture of human existence: "Life on a 
lifeboat isn't much of a life. It is like an end game in chess, a game with few 
pieces. The elements couldn't be more simple, nor the stakes higher. 
Physically it is extraordinarily arduous, and morally it is killing. You must 
make adjustments if you want to survive" (217). 
One of the adjustments, however, is giving up the fascination with the 
"clash of civilizations" theory. Unlike Huntington, Martel does not allow us 
to rub shoulders and indulge in the justice of the Western cause. Rather, he 
makes us realize that in order to cope with the harsh political realities we 
face, we need to reach out to other cultures and religions; for the knowledge, 
love, hope, and a sense of purpose required to survive the hard journey into 
the 21st century may be found outside our own civilization. 
This is advocated as a realistic approach to human affairs, which brings 
up once again Lester Pearson's claim that coexistence is a realistic policy. 
As Pearson (1955,121) writes in Democracy and World Affairs, "The true 
realist is the man who sees things both as they are and as they can be. In 
every situation there is the possibility of improvement, in every life the 
hidden capacity for something better. True realism involves a dual vision, 
sight and insight. To see only half the situation, either the actual or the 
possible, is to be not a realist but in blinkers. 
Note 
* I am indebted to Myron J. Aronoff of Rutgers University and Karim-Aly Kassam 
of Cornell University for their helpful comments on a former draft of this article. 
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